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Abstract 
Using high frequency data from the London Stock Exchange (LSE), we investigate the 
relationship between informed trading and the price impact of block trades on intraday and 
inter-day basis. Price impact of block trades is stronger during the first hour of trading; this is 
consistent with the hypothesis that information accumulates overnight during non-trading 
hours. Furthermore, private information is gradually incorporated into prices despite 
heightened trading frequency. Evidence suggests that informed traders exploit superior 
information across trading days, and stocks with lower transparency exhibit stronger 
information diffusion effects when traded in blocks, thus informed block trading facilitates 
price discovery. 
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1. Introduction 
The role played by information in the price discovery process is well documented. Early 
informed trading studies suggest that informed traders prefer using large trades in order to 
minimise transaction costs and to maximise the profit gained from their informed trading 
activities. This is because they face competition from other informed traders and their private 
information could be short-lived (Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Karpoff, 1987). In contrast with 
this paper, most existing studies on how private information is incorporated into stock prices 
through block trades focus mainly on trading evolution around corporate events in order to 
control for private information. This is because evidence suggests that corporate events can 
stimulate the pre-announcement drive for acquiring private information (Daley et al., 1995). 
Permanent price impact measures are usually employed as proxies for the informativeness of 
block trades, since they reflect observable price adjustment for information.  
Despite the large volume of existing literature on informed trading, there are several 
unresolved questions about how and when informed traders choose to employ private 
information. For example, a stream of literature which includes Kyle (1985), Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1994) and Hong and Stein (1999), argues that 
informed traders would employ their private information gradually rather than quickly. 
However, Easley and O'Hara (1987) and Karpoff (1987) differ, suggesting that informed 
traders are more likely to aggressively trade with their private information rather than gradually 
exploit it. Also, Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001) argue that informed traders 
are more likely to exploit their information using medium-sized trades, while Blau et al. (2009) 
hold that informed traders do indeed still prefer block trades for informed trading. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the informativeness of block trades by testing 
the competing information diffusion hypotheses stated above. Our contributions are three-fold: 
firstly, the models employed in this paper present new empirical evidence on the diffusion 
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process of private information in a high frequency trading environment. Instead of focusing 
trades around short term corporate events and insider trading sample, we expand observations 
of block trades to normal trading periods. This is because informed trading activities occur not 
only around corporate events but also across regular trading hours.  
Secondly, we find intraday and inter-day patterns within this information diffusion 
process. The results suggest that the impounding of information into stock prices is stronger in 
the first trading hour than at other time periods during the normal trading day. Further, informed 
trading at day t-1 could still affect informed traders’ block transaction at day t. These results 
support the theoretical frameworks of Kyle (1985), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster 
and Viswanathan (1994) and Hong and Stein (1999) that suggest that private information is 
gradually impounded into instrument prices because informed traders slowly exploit the private 
information across trading days. The results, however, run contrary to the expectation that 
informed traders quickly take advantage of their private information by trading quickly and 
aggressively, as suggested by Easley and O'Hara (1987) and Karpoff (1987). It is interesting 
that high frequency data from an era that is characterised by short-termism in trading terms 
could validate theoretical propositions (such as that of Kyle, 1985) from an era in which buy 
and hold strategies were more orthodox.  
Thirdly, since the probability of the occurrence of an informed trade (PIN) also reflects 
the level of firms’ financial transparency (Vega, 2006), we stratify our sample stocks into four 
portfolios according to the mean value of their daily PINs, and show that the information 
incorporation process can vary across stocks with different levels of financial transparency. 
The results imply that the larger the levels of informed trading in a stock, the higher the 
permanent price impact of block trades. There are several implications of this, including that 
informed trading aids the price discovery process for less transparent stocks.  
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Permanent price impact reflects the lasting price changes in a stock as a result of a trade; 
this implies that such trade contains information. Hasbrouck (1991a; 1991b) utilises the vector 
autoregression (VAR) model to examine the informativeness of trades leading to permanent 
price impact. Seppi (1992) finds that the permanent price impacts of block trades prior to 
earnings announcements correlate with quarter earnings surprise. Daley et al. (1995) focus on 
block trades around the earning announcement periods. They suggest that the permanent price 
impact of block trades during the five days prior to the earning announcement is larger than 
during the post-earning announcement period of the same duration. However, Barclay and 
Warner’s (1993) stealth trading hypothesis indicates that, in order to hide information, 
informed trades are concentrated on the medium size transactions during the pre-tender offer 
announcement period. Using audit trail data for a sample of NYSE firms, Chakravarty (2001) 
finds that institutional traders are more informed, and medium-sized institutional trades are the 
drivers in the movement of prices, thus supporting Barclay and Warner’s (1993) findings on 
the informativeness of medium sized trades.  
Other studies such as Huang and Masulis (2003) and Alexander and Peterson (2007) 
also offer evidence on order-splitting strategies from informed traders. Blau et al. (2009) 
provide a comprehensive explanation of the association between informed trades and block 
trades. Their results show that informed traders still prefer block trades during the periods of 
high trading activities because a deep market can provide natural camouflage to hide 
information. Yang (2009) suggests that informed traders focus on medium sized trades from 
six to ten days prior to the quarterly earnings announcements. However, informed traders 
aggressively increase their order size five days before the announcement. Frino and Romano 
(2010) employ a theoretical model to show that market conditions could determine the size of 
informed trades. They suggest that information effect plays a role in weak bull and bear markets 
rather than strong bull and bear markets. Informed traders are likely to trade large orders when 
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informational profit outweighs the transaction cost in weak bull and bear markets. Saar (2001) 
suggests that portfolio managers search for block trades based on favourable private 
information, and rebalance portfolios by selling stocks that have less favourable prospects. 
Using permanent price impact as an adjustment to private information around corporate events, 
this research implies that block trade is a powerful indicator for information asymmetry. If a 
stock is traded based on liquidity reasons rather than information motives, then the price impact 
of block trade should be relatively small. Hence, the more informative trading is, the bigger its 
permanent price impact should be (Aktas et al., 2007).  
Besides examining trades around corporate events, researchers also investigate the 
impact of informed trades by looking into insider trading activities. John and Lang (1991) find 
evidence of signalling theory of dividends by looking at how the information content of 
dividends may be ‘nuanced’ by inside trading prior to the dividend announcement. Their results 
reveal that for firms with good growth expectations, the market reacts positively to dividend 
initiations even when insiders are net sellers. Meulbroek (1992) illustrates that price responds 
rapidly to illegal insider trading. Lin and Rozeff (1995) examine the speed of price adjustment 
to private information and find that more than 85% of private information is absorbed within 
one day. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) examine net purchases and sales from insider trading 
activities, and their results show statistically significant but economically insignificant market 
movement around the insider trading activities.    
Most informed trading studies mainly focus on the periods around corporate events and 
insider trading activities, which account for a very small fraction of stocks’ normal trading 
hours. This paper is motivated by the need to examine the evolution and impact of informed 
trading throughout normal trading hours. We also investigate the characterisations of the 
information diffusion process by testing intraday effects, long-lived information and firms’ 
various levels of financial transparency. Our empirical models are based on the assumption that 
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informed traders prefer to execute block trades.  Kyle (1985) and Hong and Stein (1999) 
explain the gradual information diffusion process using theoretical equilibrium frameworks. 
These findings are supported by Hong et al.’s (2000) analysis, in which analyst coverage is 
used to proxy firm-specific information flow. Hong et al. (2000) provide some empirical 
evidence that stock momentum reflects the gradual diffusion of firm specific information. 
However, Vega (2006) argues that the analyst coverage is not a good proxy for information 
flow across traders.  
This paper employs probability of information-based trading (PIN) to proxy the 
proportion of the unobservable informed trades across normal trading hours. PIN has been 
elaborated in previous work (see for example Easley et al., 1996a; 1996b; 1997a). Easley et al. 
(2002) find that a difference of 10% in PIN between two stocks leads to a difference in the 
excessive returns of 2.5% per annum. This implies that uninformed investors demand a 
premium to hold stocks with higher information risk. PIN has been extensively used to capture 
information asymmetry. Easley et al. (2010) use the returns of high and low-PIN portfolios to 
construct a risk factor which explains portfolio returns. Vega (2006) constructs PIN to test 
market efficiency, suggesting that the more information investors have about the true value of 
an asset, the smaller the abnormal return drift. Chung et al. (2005), using a sample of NYSE 
stocks, examine the relationship between price impacts of all trades, serial correlation in trade 
direction, and PIN. They find that there is a positive relationship between PIN and permanent 
price impacts of all trades, and stocks with higher PIN exhibit higher correlations in the trade 
direction. Their result is consistent with information hypothesis that strategic trading of 
informed trades results in serially correlated trades. Based on three months-worth of NYSE 
and NASDAQ transactions data, Lee and Chung (2009) find a negative relationship between 
price improvement in NYSE stocks and PIN. This suggests that liquidity providers on the 
NYSE offer greater price improvements for stocks with a lower PIN. However, Lai et al. (2014) 
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deconstruct PIN into risk and liquidity components and they find that only the liquidity 
component is priced. Lai et al. (2014) also construct stock-level PINs over a 15-year period in 
47 stock markets worldwide. Their results show the variations of PIN between emerging and 
developed markets. However, they do not find that PIN exhibits explanatory power to expected 
stock returns in global stock markets.  
Consistent with the existing market microstructure literature, we use PIN to proxy 
informed trades in our analysis of the permanent price impact1 of block trades. Given the 
assumption that informed traders execute block trades to exploit superior information, we focus 
on the association between unobservable informed trading and observable permanent price 
impact of block trades, in order to determine the informativeness of block trades. Our central 
hypothesis is that, if private information does diffuse into price via block trades, a higher 
fraction of informed trades will lead to more information being revealed through block trading 
activity. Hence, the relationship between PIN and the permanent price impact of block 
purchases (sales) should be positive (negative). The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows: section 2 discusses the data and our econometric methodology; in section 3 we provide 
analysis of our results and provide extensions to the main analysis; and Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Data 
2.1.1. Sample selection 
Our data consists of FTSE 100 stocks, which account for about 80% of total market 
capitalisation on the LSE. The LSE is a hybrid trading platform, hosting the upstairs dealer 
market and the downstairs order-driven, i.e. the transparent order book named the Stock 
                                                          
1 We also examine the temporary price impact and the total price impact in this paper. Relevant analyses are 
presented in subsequent sections. 
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Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS). By design the dealer market hosts large 
liquidity-driven institutional trades with little, but not negligible, price impact in the market 
since the trades are bilateral and are based on reference prices from the downstairs market (see 
Armitage and Ibikunle, 2015; Jain et al., 2003). Hence, in order to adequately examine the price 
impact of block trades on the LSE one needs to examine the downstairs market data. 
Furthermore, according to Armitage and Ibikunle (2015), the downstairs market routinely 
accounts for roughly about 82.1% of all transactions in the FTSE 100. The intraday SETS 
transactions data for this research comes from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) 
Database. Our dataset contains 253 trading days from 1st October 2012 to 30th September 20132 
and includes variables such as Reuters Identification Code (RIC), date, timestamp, price, 
volume, bid price, ask price, bid volume and ask volume. Each trade has been allocated 
corresponding prevailing best bid and ask quotes. Since we only focus on normal trading hours, 
we delete the opening auction period (7:50hrs – 8:00hrs) and the closing auction period 
(16:30hrs – 16:35hrs).  
Following data cleaning, the dataset comprises of 44,742,693 transactions, which are 
restricted to regular trades with eligible best bid and ask prices. We define block trades in line 
with Frino et al. (2007) as the largest 1% of the trades in each stock. There are two main reasons 
why we have not defined block trades in terms of absolute size. The first is the potential for 
noise. The LSE is the fourth largest exchange in the world and one of the most liquid, simply 
setting 10,000 shares as a block trade threshold across the entire sample period in the London 
high frequency trading environment could lead to the inclusion of trades based on noise and 
                                                          
2 Although our data range is one year, the sample size is the large ever examined in the price impact of block 
trades literature. The overall cleaned sample of all buy and sell trades contains 44,742,693 transactions in FTSE 
100 stocks across 253 trading days. By contrast, Alzahrani et al. (2013), the paper with the next largest base 
dataset has only 20,297,452 transactions in their base dataset, and other papers even have much less. Furthermore, 
our final sample of block trades (based on our selection criteria) consists of 453,012 LSE block trades in total. By 
comparison, this is a much larger block trades sample than the 166,976 ASX block trades employed by Frino et 
al. (2007) and the16,951 NYSE block trades employed by Madhavan and Cheng (1997). 
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liquidity demand. Secondly, there is a distinctively large variation in the liquidity properties of 
FTSE 100 stocks. Ibikunle (2015a) show that the largest trading volume quintile FTSE 100 
stocks have average trade sizes that are on average more than 33 times the size of the lowest 
volume quintile stocks in the same index. Thus, a 10,000-share trade in one stock could be its 
median while such trade could sit in above the 95th percentile in a less liquid stock. Furthermore, 
we bunch trades occurring during the same millisecond by aggregating their volume and price 
Huang and Stoll (1997); the price used is the weighted average of all the trades during that 
millisecond weighed by the volume of each transaction. Millisecond rather than second is 
chosen as the relevant time interval, in contrast with the second interval used by Spierdijk (2004) 
and Engle and Russell (1998), due to the ultrahigh frequency nature of the data we employ. 
Finally, we also classify trades into purchase or sale by using the established Lee and Ready 
(1991) tick rule algorithm. Specifically, when the transaction price is higher than the prevailing 
quote mid-point, we classify the transaction as a buyer-initiated (purchase) trade. If price is the 
execution price lower than quote mid-point, then we classify it as seller-initiated (sale) trade. 
If the current and the previous trades are the same price, we classify using the next previous 
trade. Aitken and Frino (1996) and Lee and Ready (1991) suggest that the tick rule has an 
accuracy in excess of 90%. These two classification conditions yield 206,002 block purchases 
and 246,867 block sales in our final sample.   
 
2.1.2. Sample Description 
Table 1 shows the descriptive data of block trades based on midpoint classification. The 
average number of shares and average traded values of block sales are greater than those of 
block purchases. However, the average value of price impact of block purchases is 0.020%, 
which is more pronounced than the absolute value of the permanent price impact of block sales, 
at -0.011%. This is significant given that the average price impact is computed from trades 
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occurring at very short intervals of less than 50 seconds in all cases. The impact asymmetry is 
expected given that prices usually fall after a seller-initiated trade and appreciate after a buyer-
initiated trade (see Kraus and Stoll, 1972).  The phenomenon is also attributable to the fact that 
block sales are usually initiated on the basis of a number of factors, one of which is the search 
for liquidity, while block purchases are more likely to contain firm specific information. This 
price impact asymmetry is also documented in Keim and Madhavan (1996) and Saar (2001). 
The BAS average for block sales is larger than that for block purchases. This is surprising given 
that the literature suggests that spreads are larger for informed trades. It is important to point 
out, however, that the difference between both estimates is small and is not statistically 
significant at any conventional level. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the explanatory 
variables. We observe that there are no multicollinearity issues within the secondary model for 
the price impact of block trades.  
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.2. Methodology 
2.2.1. The Price Impact Model 
We start by constructing three types of price impact that are generally accepted in the literature. 
These include temporary, permanent and total price impact measures. In the microstructure 
literature, the permanent price impacts as trading effects on price caused by informed trading, 
while temporary price impacts usually result from noise or liquidity trading, thus leading to 
price reversal (see for example Glosten and Harris, 1988; Chan and Lakonishok, 1995; Easley 
et al., 2002). Block trades demand more liquidity than is likely to be available at current quoted 
prices. Therefore in order to ensure the execution of such trades against the expressed level of 
liquidity, it will have to ‘walk’ through the order book. This will result in the move of prices 
in the trade direction; specifically, purchase trades will force an upward swing and sales will 
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force a downward swing. The temporary impact on the other hand captures the market’s 
frictional price reaction to the execution of a block trade, which should be reversed soon after 
the block trade. Equation (1) expresses how we measure the temporary price impact as the 
liquidity effect of executing a block trade. The price deviation on account of an un-informed 
block trade execution occurs because counterparties at the best expressed corresponding quote 
are not readily available. The temporary effect is therefore compensation to the counterparties 
providing the liquidity needed for an un-informed block trade execution. Block purchasers 
(sellers) offer a price premium (discount) as compensation in order to ensure trade execution. 
The permanent impact captures the lasting impact of a block trade execution, that is, 
the price change that is not reversed within a reasonable timeframe after the block trade 
execution. The information element of a block trade execution is therefore captured by the 
permanent impact. The lack of price reversal in this case suggests a learning event in the market, 
which ultimately results in the discovery of a new price for the traded instrument. Consistent 
with Holthausen et al. (1990), Gemmill (1996), Frino et al. (2007) and Alzahrani et al. (2013), 
we employ the five-trade benchmark to calculate the price impact measures. Thus, for 
temporary price impact (Equation 1), we measure the percentage of price reversal after five 
trades after a block trade execution, and for permanent price impact Equation (2) captures the 
percentage change in price from five trades before the block trade to five trades following the 
block trade. The third price impact measure, total impact, captures the total percentage price 
impact, which includes both the liquidity and the information component. Computing all three 
measures as percentage returns ensures comparability with existing studies: 
                                                                                                 (1) 
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                                                                                                          (3) 
We modify the model of Frino et al. (2007), thereafter employed by Alzahrani et al. (2013), in 
order to investigate our research questions. We thus estimate the following regression with 
stock-specific variables: 




31121019876
54321
||
lnlnPr
DUMDUMDUMOIBBASMomentum
returnMarketTurnoverVolatilitySizePINimpactice
                  
(4) 
where Price impact refers to one of three measures: temporary, permanent and total price 
impacts.  PIN is a daily approximation of informed trading in every stock obtained through the 
maximum likelihood estimation of Equation (6) and as discussed in Section 2.2.2. This is the 
most important variable we study in this paper. We expect to see a positive (negative) relation 
between PIN and the permanent price impact of purchase (sale) block trades. This is because 
price shifts should follow the direction of an informed trade; hence we expect that an informed 
block purchase (sale) will lead to appreciation (depreciation). lnSize is the natural logarithm of 
the number of shares traded and reported to the nearest millisecond. Based on the established 
premise that size is related to the information content of a trade (see for example Kraus and 
Stoll, 1972; Chan and Lakonishok, 1997), we also proxy information content using block trade 
size.  
Volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day prior to the block 
trade. It shows the intraday trading fluctuations in stock prices and therefore reflects the 
dispersion of beliefs about stock valuation in the market. An increase in volatility of a stock 
will increase its market risk, leading to larger spreads as well as larger price impact. Since prior 
contributions also suggest that investor demand for compensation corresponds to stock 
riskiness (Chan and Lakonishok, 1997; Alzahrani et al., 2013; Frino et al., 2007), we therefore 
expect a positive relationship between price impact and Volatility. lnTurnover is the natural 
5
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logarithm of the total pound value of stocks traded divided by the pound value of shares 
outstanding on the trading day prior to the block trade. Turnover is employed by many 
researchers to measure liquidity in the market (see as examples Lakonishok and Lev, 1987). 
Investors are expected to demand higher premium to trade illiquid stocks (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996), hence we expect an inverse 
relationship to exist between price impact and Turnover. This means that when liquidity is 
higher, there should be lower price impact and vice versa. 
 Market return is the daily return on the FTSE 100 index. It is included in the regression 
model because literature has found that most stocks have positive beta (Aitken and Frino, 1996; 
Chiyachantana et al., 2004; Frino et al., 2007). Thus, a positive relationship is expected to exist 
between market return and price impact. Momentum is calculated as the lagged cumulative 
daily return for each stock on the five trading days prior to the block trades. Momentum 
captures the trading trend for each stock. Thus, higher returns indicate a purchasing trend, and 
lower returns indicate a selling trend. Saar (2001) argues that the historical performance of 
stocks is related to their expected price impact asymmetry. Specifically, block trades that are 
executed following a depreciating price trend will exhibit higher positive asymmetry, and block 
trades executed following a run of price appreciation should display less price impact, or 
perhaps negative asymmetry. Specifically, historical cumulative lagged returns correspond to 
the magnitude of price impact. A positive relationship is therefore expected between 
momentum and price impact due to the herding effect. BAS is the relative bid-ask spread prior 
to the block trades. We calculate relative bid-ask spread as the ask price prior to the block trade 
minus the bid price before the block trade, divided by the midpoint of both prices. This measure 
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is a proxy for liquidity, and when liquidity is high, BAS tends to be narrow. Hence, we expect 
lower price impact when spreads are narrow and larger price impact when they are wide.3  
OIB corresponds to daily order imbalance. This variable and PIN are new additions to 
the Frino et al. (2007) price impact model. We compute OIB as shown in Equation (5) for each 
day.4 According to Chordia et al. (2008) , the extent of the predictability of returns by lagged 
OIB is an inverse measure of market efficiency. OIB in the model is therefore a proxy for how 
efficiently each stock is being traded.  
                                                                                                         (5) 
Time dummy variables are used to capture intraday effects of the private information diffusion 
process. Frino et al. (2007) and Alzahrani et al. (2013) document intraday patterns in the price 
impact of block trades. In this paper, we employ dummy variables to capture intraday patterns 
of price effects. DUM1 equals to one if block trade occurs between 8:00 and 9:00, and is 
otherwise zero. DUM2 equals to one if the block trade occurs during 9:00 to 15:30, and is 
otherwise zero.  DUM3 equals to one if block trade occurs during 15:30 to 16:00, and is 
otherwise zero. The last trading period (16:00 – 16:30) is not in the regression, as it is the 
reference group of block trades. 
 
2.2.2. The PIN Model 
In order to capture the informed trading elements of stock for each day, we compute the daily 
probabilities of informed trading (PINs) based on the PIN model of Easley et al. (1996a) and 
Easley et al. (1997b). The model as specified is based on the expectation that trading between 
                                                          
3 For robustness, we also estimate Equation (4) using the effective bid-ask spread measure, defined as twice the 
absolute value of the difference between the execution price for a block transaction and the prevailing quote mid-
point at the time of the transaction, as the liquidity proxy. The results, which are available on request, are 
qualitatively unaffected by the substitution of a liquidity proxy. 
4 We also compute OIB for each 5-minute period preceding a block trade. The results obtained using the 5-minute 
OIB measure are not qualitatively different from the main results presented in this paper. 
|
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informed traders, liquidity traders and market makers occurs repeatedly over numerous trading 
intervals. As presented in Figure 1, trading intervals begin with the informed traders acquiring 
a private signal on a stock’s value with a probability of α. Dependent on the arrival of a private 
signal, bad news will arrive with a probability of δ, and good news arrives with a probability 
of (1 – δ). The market makers determine their bid and ask prices, with orders arriving from 
liquidity traders at the arrival rate ε. If there is a new piece of private information, informed 
traders will also trade and their orders will arrive at the rate μ. Hence, informed traders will 
execute a purchase trade should they receive a good news signal and sell if they receive a bad 
news signal. It is important to point out that the setting of different arrival rates for uninformed 
buyers and sellers does not qualitatively alter estimations of the probability that an informed 
trade has been executed (see Easley et al., 2002).  
The PIN model allows us to approximate the unobservable distribution of trades 
between informed and uninformed traders through the modelling of purchases and sales.5 Thus, 
the ‘normal level’ of sales and purchases executed within a stock on a given day over several 
intervals is interpreted as an uninformed trade by the model, and this information is employed 
when estimating ε. An unusual volume of purchase or sale transactions is interpreted as an 
information-based trade and employed when computing μ. In addition, the frequency of 
intervals during which ‘abnormal’ levels of purchase and sale transactions are executed is used 
when calculating the values of α and δ. These calculations are conducted in a simultaneous 
fashion by the use of the maximum likelihood estimation method. Supposing that the 
uninformed and informed trades arrive as a Poisson distribution, the likelihood function for the 
PIN model for each interval estimated can be expressed as: 
                                                          
5 As stated earlier, we infer purchase and sales through the running of Lee and Ready’s (1991) trade classification 
algorithm. 
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                       (6)              
 
where B and S respectively represent the total number of purchase and sale transactions for 
each one hour trading period within each trading day. θ = (α, δ, μ, ε) is the parameter vector 
for the structural model. Equation (6) corresponds to a mix of distributions in which the 
possible trades are weighted by the probability of a one hour trading period with no news (1 – 
α), a one hour trading period with good news (α (1 – δ)) or a one hour trading period with bad 
news (αδ). Based on the assumption that this process ensues independently across the different 
trading periods, Easley et al. (1996a) and Easley et al. (1997b) compute the parameter vector 
estimates using maximum likelihood estimation. Hence we obtain the parameters for each 
trading day and for each stock in the sample by maximum likelihood estimation. We follow 
Easley et al. (1996a) and Easley et al. (1997b) to compute PIN as:    
                                                                                                                     (7) 
We include the daily stock-dependent PIN variable into the regression model (4).  
 
3. Regression Results and Discussion 
3.1. Preliminary Predictive Analysis 
We commence our analysis by first examining the hypothesised relationship between the 
number/proportion of informed trades and the number of block trades executed on the same 
day. This is important in order to confirm our assumption that informed traders take advantage 
of their information by executing block trades. We approximate the number of informed trades 
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occurring for each day by manipulating parameters obtained through the maximum likelihood 
estimation of the PIN model. Since α corresponds to the probability of information events and 
arrival rate of informed orders, μ, the number of informed trades may be expressed as the 
product of α and μ. We therefore estimate the following regression in order to test the 
assumption that informed traders use block trades as a trading vehicle.  
                                                                   (8) 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 shows the statistical results. As expected, the positive and significant coefficient of 
informed trades indicates that with a 1% increase in the number of informed trades the number 
of block trades correspondingly increases 1.11% on the same trading day. The adjusted R2 is 
about 52.18%, which is high for a univariate estimation. This is an indication that variation in 
the estimated number of informed trades can be explained by the quantity of block trades. This 
result is consistent with Easley and O'Hara (1987) and Blau et al. (2009), who suggest that 
informed traders prefer block trades to exploit private information. However, this result may 
be viewed to some extent as a contradiction of Barclay and Warner (1993) stealth trading 
hypothesis, which implies that most of cumulative price changes are due to mid-size trades. 
One of the explanations could be that Barclay and Warner (1993) focus on trades prior to tender 
offer events, during which any larger order could easily attract other investors’ unwanted 
attention. Informed traders might therefore be more discrete in their exploitation of private 
information by splitting up large orders. In contrast, during uneventful trading periods informed 
traders might prefer block trades because they believe the market can absorb large orders 
without attracting undue attention. The view that stealth trading is mainly prevalent during 
eventful periods is further emphasised by Yang (2009). Yang (2009) reports that there is an 
increase in the implementation of stealth trading from around six to ten days prior to the release 
of quarterly earnings. However, informed traders are likely to aggressively exploit private 
 )ln(#)ln(# tt tradesInformedtradesBlock
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information through the use of larger trades from about five days prior to the earnings 
announcements. Despite the inconsistency in the evidence, theoretical and empirical studies 
generally agree that informed traders are more likely to exploit private information by trading 
block sizes.  
 
3.2.  Trading on Information with Block Trades 
Following the establishment of a predictive relationship between informed trading and block 
trades, we now examine the process by which information is compounded in instrument prices 
via block trading. Panels A, B and C of Table 4 present the estimated parameters from Equation 
(4) for all three price impact measures and for block purchases, block sales and all block trades 
in the sample. For block purchases, PIN shows a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with both permanent and temporary price impacts. The PIN Permanent price 
impact of block purchases is 0.000294, while the corresponding temporary price impact is 
0.000386. The lesser permanent price impact coefficient estimate implies that the FTSE 100 
stocks are less sensitive to informed trades than they are to liquidity trades. Consistent with our 
expectations, the PIN coefficient estimates for block sales are negative and statistically 
significant for both the temporary and permanent price impact regressions. As with the block 
purchases, there is a stronger level of temporary price impact than there is for permanent price 
impact. The negative (positive) statistically significant coefficient estimates of the PIN 
coefficients for the block sales (purchases) appear to confirm the information diffusion 
hypothesis via block trading.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The absolute value of the PIN coefficient against the permanent price impact of block sales is 
0.0002, which is smaller than that in block purchases at 0.000294. This level of price impact 
asymmetry is consistent with previous literature (see for example, Gemmill, 1996) in which 
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there is an implicit assumption that block purchases are more informative than block sales. 
Conventional explanation for this phenomenon is that, generally, buy trades are more likely to 
be induced by private information than by liquidity considerations; the motivation is the 
opposite for sell trades. However, regulations prohibit investors from exploiting negative 
private information. For example, in the UK the Financial Conduct Authority bans investors 
from short selling financial service stocks listed on the LSE. The information diffusion process 
of block purchases will, in all likelihood, be stronger than that of block sales. The estimated 
PIN coefficient for the permanent price impact of all block trades is not statistically significant. 
This is because the coefficient sign is positive for price impact of block purchase and negative 
for price impact of block sells, while PIN is ranged from zero to one. Thus, PIN cannot 
statistically explain the variation in price impact when the price impact effects of block 
purchases and block sales increase simultaneously. 
Estimated coefficients for other explanatory variables are largely consistent with 
existing literature on the price impact of block trades. We find that size has a positive 
coefficient related to the temporary effect of block purchases, the permanent effect of block 
sales and all block trades. This suggests that volume has a direct relationship with inventory 
costs and that price impact is an increasing (decreasing) function of trade size in purchase (sell) 
block trades (Alzahrani et al., 2013). However, the coefficient for the permanent price impact 
of block purchases is not significant. In addition, the size variable exhibits intriguing coefficient 
behaviour. The positive effect of size on permanent impacts indicates that the largest block 
sales will have smaller price impacts compared with small and medium block sales. This could 
mean that, within the largest 1% of trades, relatively small trades are more informative. This 
evidence is in line with Barclay and Warner (1993) findings that informed traders prefer to split 
their largest orders for execution as medium-sized ones. One plausible aim of this behaviour is 
to camouflage informed trades as uninformed smaller trades in the order flow. Since there is a 
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consistent general view that large trades imply informed trading, trading in smaller sizes 
affords the opportunity to avoid detection of informed large orders. Another aim, related to the 
first, is that a large trade may not necessarily be informed but, since it could be treated as such, 
a liquidity trader may be inclined to execute it as smaller trades in order to avoid paying a 
premium or offering a discount. 
Volatility exhibits a statistically significant positive relationship with the temporary 
effect of block purchases and entire block trades. The positive coefficients of temporary price 
impact of block purchases are in line with literature that states that counterparties will demand 
higher premium in order to assume higher market risk (see Alzahrani et al., 2013; Chan and 
Lakonishok, 1997; Frino et al., 2007). However, we also observe some mild and inexplicable 
inconsistencies which show that volatility is positively related to the temporary price impact of 
block sales, and negatively related with total price impact of both block sales and all block 
trades. Given the general lack of statistical analysis of the purchase block trades’ volatility 
coefficient estimates; it appears that the driver of the all block trades coefficient estimates is 
the evolution of the sale block trades. Turnover has a statistically significant positive effect on 
the temporary and permanent price impact of block purchase, and a negative effect on 
permanent price impact of block sales. These estimates imply that higher liquidity can induce 
a higher permanent price impact in FTSE100 block trades. This result contradicts the argument 
of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) liquidity effect 
proposition that traders ask for higher premium in order to trade illiquidity stocks. However, 
our results can be justified as larger block trades can alter perception of the market value of 
stocks (Alzahrani et al., 2013). Regardless of liquidity constraints, chasing momentum could 
generate high turnover and, in turn, a price run-up (Chan et al., 1996). We examine the effect 
of momentum below. 
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Literature suggests that market return should have a positive relationship with price 
impact. However, our estimates show that market return has a negative effect on the permanent 
and temporary price impacts of block purchases. The coefficient estimates suggest that there is 
a reduced price impact for block purchases when market returns rise. The positive and 
statistically significant market return coefficient for the block sales’ temporary price impact is 
however in line with literature, which suggests a reduced price impact for block sales (see Frino 
et al., 2007). For momentum, coefficient estimates for total price impact is negative and 
statistically significant at 0.01, level thus implying that a higher recent price run-up will 
generate a smaller price impact for block purchases (Saar, 2001). Chiyachantana et al. (2004) 
make similar inferences based on their analysis; they argue that institutional investors prefer to 
purchase after days of price run-up in order to induce lower price changes. By contrast, 
momentum has positive effects on the permanent and temporary price impact measures of 
block sales, and both coefficient estimates are statistically significant. This reversal sign of 
momentum variable indicates price reversals associated with block purchases. Positive 
momentum coefficient estimates suggest that a stock with a momentum trend in its 
performance is expected to have a lower price impact for block sales. This is in line with our 
observation regarding the turnover estimates above, as well as with Saar (2001) prediction. 
Thus, the estimated coefficients for both market return and momentum generally imply that 
market return contributes to the price impact asymmetry of purchases and sales. 
Order imbalance coefficient estimates for total price impact and temporary price impact 
of block sales and all block trades are all positive and significant. This is because order 
imbalance measures the daily excess amount of buy orders over sell orders, it conveys 
information to the market makers and traders about the intraday variations in the order flow 
and, ultimately, the perceived value of instruments. Higher order imbalance would imply 
deviation from the norm leading to a perception that the market is inefficient. Thus the 
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coefficient values imply that for block sales, during pockets of inefficiency, there is reduced 
price impact and even though not statistically significant, the positive block purchase 
coefficients imply the increasing price impact of total block trades (Chordia et al., 2002). Bid-
ask spread (BAS) is positively related to the price impact of block purchases, and negatively 
related to the price impact of block sales, with the exception of the permanent price impact. 
Consistent with Aitken and Frino (1996), results show that when bid-ask spread is wider the 
price impact is greater for both purchase and block sales.  
For intraday effects, dummy variables DUM1 and DUM2 in the permanent price impact 
of block purchases show a positive and significant relationship with price impact. However, 
the coefficient on DUM1 is larger than on DUM2, indicating that the price impact is stronger 
during the first hour (8:00 – 9:00) than during midday trading hours (9:00 – 15:30). Similarly, 
dummy variables DUM1 and DUM2 in the permanent price impact of block sales show a 
negative and significant relationship with price impact. Overall, the DUM1 permanent price 
impact coefficients for both block purchases and sales are larger than the DUM1 temporary 
price impact coefficients. This confirms the expectation that information is accumulated 
overnight and is thus incorporated into the prices of stocks during the first hour of trading the 
next day (see also Ibikunle, 2015a).  
Our regression model is similar to that of Alzahrani et al. (2013), who study the impacts 
of block trades in the Saudi Stock Market (SSM). They find that permanent price impact is 
generally larger than temporary price impact. Their results reveal that most of their independent 
variables can significantly explain the variations of the permanent price impact, implying that 
independent variables in their model can, potentially, be used to predict the movement of price 
impact of block trades. Therefore, they conclude that the SSM is highly sensitive to the 
informed trades. In contrast, our results are based on a more developed market and a highly 
liquid sample of FTSE100 stocks, and largely differ from Alzahrani et al. (2013) in that the 
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temporary price impact of block trades is generally more pronounced than the permanent price 
impact of block purchases. We also find price impact asymmetry; purchase blocks have higher 
information diffusion effects than sale blocks. Additionally, not all of the control variables can 
statistically explain the variation of permanent price impact. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.3. Intraday Patterns 
The dummy variables in the full sample regression imply intraday patterns of price impact; we 
therefore examine this trend in more detail. First, we compute the average price impact 
measures for every half-hour as presented in Table 5.  As expected, there is an emerging pattern 
in the price impact of block trades. For example, the permanent price impact estimates for both 
block purchases and sales are largest during early trading. This is consistent with Ibikunle 
(2015a) who argues that roughly 40% of close-close price discovery for FTSE 100 stocks occur 
within the first 30 minutes of continuous trading on an average day, the remaining 60% is 
distributed across the day. This uneven pattern is due to the large amount of information 
accumulated overnight and is being released into the market through new orders during the 
early continuous trading period.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
In order to explore this intraday effect of the information diffusion process more keenly, we 
exogenously split the sample into four time intervals: the first trading hour (8:00hrs – 9:00hrs), 
middle of the day (9:00hrs – 15:30hrs), the penultimate thirty minutes of trading (15:30hrs – 
16:00hrs) and the final thirty minutes of trading (16:00hrs – 16:30hrs). Tables 6 and 7 show 
the regression results for block purchases and sales. Panel A in Table 6 shows the regression 
coefficients of the permanent price impact of block purchase. It can be seen that the coefficient 
of PIN in the first trading hour is 0.000599, which is larger than that of the middle of day 
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trading hours’ estimate at 0.000396; both estimates are statistically significant at the 0.05 and 
0.01 levels respectively. This indicates that the information diffusion process is strongest 
during the opening hour, despite the fact that the middle trading period includes six and half 
hours of the largest volume trading. The observation is also consistent for temporary price 
impact estimates. These results are in line with Ibikunle (2015a), who argues that a substantial 
fraction of price discovery occurs during the first trading hour because large amount of new 
information, held back during the opening auction, is released into the market early on during 
the continuous trading session of the day. The PIN coefficients for the other trading sub-periods 
of the day are not statistically significant since, as shown by Ibikunle (2015a), more than 97% 
of the efficient price discovery occurs prior to the last half hour of trading for FTSE 100 stocks 
trading on the LSE.  
Results in Table 7 are very intriguing because they suggest that, while information 
diffusion behaviour is strongest during the opening hour for block purchases, block sales do 
not register statistically significant information diffusion effects until the trading day is truly 
well under way. The PIN coefficients are only statistically significant for the final two half-
hour trading periods of the day. The permanent price impact coefficient for the half-hour period 
between 15:30-16:00 hours is -0.00024 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. For the 
temporary price impact, the coefficients for the final two half-hour trading periods are -0.0014 
and -0.0018 respectively and both are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The results imply 
that when informed trading activity is highest in the market, arbitrage traders operate from 
neutral positions from where they bid for profit opportunities. According to Ibikunle (2015b), 
informed trading is high on the LSE during early trading, and decreases as the continuous 
trading session progresses. Thus, with the reduction in the arbitrage seeking activities of 
informed traders comes a reduction in purchase trades. The decreases in purchases will allow 
for increased price impact for block sales, hence the larger information diffusion activity of 
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block sales during the latter end of the continuous trading day. Overall, this section provides 
evidence that the diffusion process is strong during the opening of the trading session, when 
trading is most vigorous and there is an increased presence of informed traders (Dufour and 
Engle (2000). These results also indicate that a liquid and deep market could well facilitate the 
information diffusion process. 
INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE 
3.4. Inter-day patterns (long-lived information) 
We now explore the systematic inter-day variations of the information diffusion process. Kyle 
(1985)’s theoretical model suggests that informed traders do not immediately execute trades 
with all of the information at their disposal; rather, they do so in a gradual manner. This implies 
that information could be slowly incorporated into prices of instruments over a time frame 
longer than the length of the trading day. This theoretical position is bolstered by the empirical 
analysis of Hong et al. (2000). Using analyst coverage as a proxy for firm-specific information 
inflow, Hong et al. (2000) find that the momentum trend of stocks is caused by the slow 
impounding of firm-specific information into stock prices. The use of analyst following as a 
proxy for firm-specific (private) information has been criticised by Vega (2006); in this section, 
we employ a more generally accepted proxy for private information to examine the hypothesis 
that private information in trading could be long-lived. Foster and Viswanathan (1993) also 
propose a theoretical optimal trading strategy, in which informed traders prefer to trade 
intensively on common information, and trade less on their private information. Once common 
information is fully reflected in the stock prices, informed traders then start trading based on 
private information. This also supports the hypothesis that private information is incorporated 
into stock prices in a gradual manner. Based on the foregoing submissions, we hypothesize that 
informed traders will not fully exploit their superior information by the end of an average 
trading day; they will hold on to it and exploit it during the next trading opportunity (day). 
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According to Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), informed traders might also try to obtain 
updated private information during non-trading hours. Then, once the market opens, they may 
trade aggressively based on yesterday’s (re-evaluated) private information. We test this 
hypothesis by employing the following regression model:  
 
                (9)                    
where  is the natural logarithm of the number of block trades on dayt scaled 
by the number of block trades on day t-1. It reflects the relative change of number of block 
trades based on the previous trading day. All other variables are as previously defined. We note 
the limitations of our ability to proxy the overnight private information on day t-1, and therefore 
employ the previous day’s PIN as a proxy for existing private information prior to the current 
trading day. 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Table 8 presents the regression results from Equation (9). Panel A shows the regression results 
for the entire trading day’s block trades, while Panel B is focused only on the first hour of the 
trading day.   The focus on the first hour of trading as an extension of the analysis is based on 
the expectation that overnight private information is more likely to be traded upon within the 
first hour of trading. Most of the PINt-1 coefficients in Panels A and B are positive and 
statistically significant. This indicates that informed traders adjust their block trade positions 
on day t relative to dayt-1 based on private information gleaned during day t-1. In Panel B, the 
coefficients of PINt-1 of block purchases and sales are larger than the corresponding coefficients 
of PINt-1 in Panel A. This confirms our expectations that informed traders holding long-lived 
private information will aim to utilise it by aggressively adjusting their positions during the 
first trading hour. This is because the longer they hold on to a set of privately acquired 
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information, the more likely it is that they become public before the informed traders could 
benefit from them (see Foster and Viswanathan, 1993). Further, the market is at one of its most 
liquid (in terms of depth) and volatile intervals during the opening period, and therefore 
informed traders aim to take advantage of this natural camouflage to execute informed block 
trades. All turnover coefficients in both panels of Table 8 are, statistically, highly significant 
and positive. This implies that informed traders are more willing to adjust their block positions 
if the stock is very liquid during the previous trading day. This is because a liquid market can 
easily absorb block trades without causing large price fluctuations. We also observe that in 
Panel A, market return has statistically significant negative coefficients for purchase and sale 
block trades. A possible explanation for this could be that when the market is on the rise, 
informed traders do not adjust their positions by block trades the following day because they 
may expect a price run-up in their portfolio holdings. Informed traders also may not adjust 
positions by block sales if they have no liquidity motives to do so.    
 
3.5. Stock opacity and the incorporation of information 
The rate of information compounding for stocks is dependent on the availability of information 
through trading. We therefore expect that stocks with higher level of transparency will likely 
have different rates of information incorporation to those that are more opaque. There is an 
assumption that the more scrutinised a stock is the higher the level of its transparency (see for 
example, Hong et al.’s (2000) use of analyst coverage as a proxy for information flow). 
However, this often criticised proxy (see for example, Vega, 2006) reveals nothing about the 
information impounding process through trading. Using the PIN measure as a proxy for levels 
of stock trading transparency, we examine how the information incorporation process varies 
across FTSE 100 stocks with varying levels of transparency. Chung et al. (2005) investigate 
the relationship between informed trading and trade autocorrelation. Consistent with Easley et 
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al. (1996b), they show that small stocks are associated with high levels of information-based 
trading. Their results also suggest that a higher probability of informed trading leads to a higher 
level of serial correlation in trade direction. Vega (2006) also finds that PIN is negatively 
correlated with firm size. However, the results show that the informed trading variable alone 
cannot statistically explain the magnitude of post-announcement drift. The results suggest that 
the more information (both private and public) investors have about the true value of an asset, 
the smaller the abnormal return drift. This finding is consistent with previous research that 
small firms’ stocks experience greater post-announcement drift than large firms’ stocks, since 
small firms are generally associated with high PINs. This is related to the low level of analyst 
coverage, large concentration of informed trades, and public news surprise.  
Based on the foregoing, we hypothesise that the information diffusion process of high-
PIN stocks is stronger than that of low-PIN stocks, since firms with low financial transparency 
might have more firm-specific information to reveal, and informed trade can facilitate more 
information into price discovery. We split the sample of FTSE 100 stocks into four portfolios 
according to the mean value of intraday PIN and estimate Equation (4) for each portfolio. 
INSERT TABLES 9 AND 10 ABOUT HERE 
In Table 9, Panels A, B and C show the regression results for permanent, temporary and total 
price impacts of purchase block trades across portfolios. Clearly, PIN coefficients on 
permanent price impacts increase with the average PIN value in each portfolio. This confirms 
our expectation that the information diffusion effect is strongest for stocks with lower levels of 
transparency. However, in the case of block sales, as shown in Table 10, there is little evidence 
to support our hypothesis. It is also related to the fact that block sales are less informative than 
block purchases, since block sales are more likely to be liquidity-induced rather than 
information-based when compared to purchase trades. In this section we find that for those 
firms with relatively low financial transparency, investors and agents who are particularly 
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skilful in analysing public news play an important role in revealing information via block 
purchases. This result is in line with Vega (2006)’s finding that return of high PIN firms is less 
sensitive to the same size of surprise news than low PIN firms, because the private information 
should have already been revealed to the market by informed investors across trading periods. 
Hence, on balance, informed trading plays a positive role in facilitating more information into 
the price discovery process. 
 
4. Conclusion   
We examine intraday price impact of block trades in the presence of informed trading. While, 
previous studies mainly focus on trading around corporate events and insider trading activities, 
we expand our investigations to encompass the entire regular trading hours on the LSE. Our 
results show that the number of informed trades is positively related with the number of block 
trades. The positive (negative) relationship between informed trading, using PIN as a proxy, 
and the permanent price impact of block purchases (sales) suggests that there exists an 
impounding of private information via block trading on the LSE.  
We also find that firms with low trading transparency exhibit stronger effects for private 
information incorporation when compared with those with a high level of trading transparency. 
Informed trading plays a positive role in facilitating the price discovery process through trading 
in the direction of permanent price impact for both purchase and sale block trades. This finding 
is consistent with two streams of existing literature: insider trading (see for example John and 
Lang, 1991) and high frequency trading (see for example Brogaard et al., 2014).  
Further contributions made in this paper include new insights on the intraday and inter-
day dynamics of the private information incorporation process. Firstly, we show that 
impounding of private information into stock prices on the LSE is mostly aggressively 
propagated during the first hour of trading. This pattern is consistent with recent evidence from 
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the LSE (see Ibikunle, 2015a). Secondly however, despite the seemingly rapid private 
information usage during the trading day, traders also appear to withhold private information 
longer than a trading day window, such that trading positions are adjusted based on the previous 
day’s private information. We document a linear relationship between the lag PIN variable and 
the logarithmic of change of number of block trades, which indicates that informed traders 
adjust their block positions based on historical private information. The combination of 
intraday and inter-day patterns provides empirical support to previous theoretical contributions 
(see for example Foster and Viswanathan, 1994; Hong et al., 2000; Hong and Stein, 1999; 
Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Kyle, 1985; Lin and Rozeff, 1995) suggesting that informed 
traders gradually exploit private information. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics for Block Trades 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for purchase block, sale block and all block trades. The sample includes 
FTSE 100 stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange between 1st October 2012 and 30th September 2013. 
      
No of 
trades 
BAS 
(%) 
Avg Price 
Impact (%) 
Variance of 
Price Impact  
  
Block 
Trades   453,012 0.028 0.000 0.000035 
              
  
Buy 
(45.47%)   206,002 0.028 0.020 0.000917 
              
  
Sell 
(54.53%)   
             
246,867  0.029 -0.011 0.000007 
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TABLE 2 
Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables 
This table plots the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables employed in the price impact model in Table 4. 
PIN is the probability of an informed trade, lnSize is the natural logarithm of the number of shares per trade, volatility 
is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place, lnTurnover is the 
natural logarithm of the total stock turnover on the trading day prior to the block trade and OIB represents the order 
imbalance. BAS corresponds to the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade, Market return is the daily FTSE100 
index return on the day of the block trade, while Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days 
preceding the block trade. The sample includes FTSE 100 stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange between 1st 
October 2012 and 30th September 2013. 
  PIN Ln(size) Volatility Ln(turnover) Market Return Momentum OIB BAS 
                  
PIN 
1               
ln(size) -0.0514 1             
Volatility -0.011 -0.0088 1           
ln(turnover) 0.1478 -0.1112 -0.0073 1         
Market Return 0.0067 0.0062 0.0444 0.0217 1       
Momentum 0.0218 -0.0369 0.0148 0.0253 0.0114 1     
OIB 0.3191 -0.0321 0.0009 0.0669 0.0039 0.0156 1   
BAS 0.2846 0.0883 -0.0093 0.1225 -0.0018 -0.0343 0.1 1 
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TABLE 3 
Predictive Analysis Test 
This table shows the results of regressing the natural logarithm of the daily number of block trades against the 
natural logarithm of estimated number of daily informed trades. We use the following model: 
 
The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. *** corresponds to statistical significance at 
the 0.01 level. The sample includes FTSE 100 stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange between 1st October 
2012 and 30th September 2013.     
 
    
  Coefficient S.E. 
      
  1.11*** 2.83×10-2 
     
Constant 2.47*** 4.98×10-2 
      
Observations 2,007   
R-squared 52.20%   
Adj R-squared 52.18%   
     
 
 
  )ln(#)ln(# tt tradesInformedtradesBlock
)ln(# ttradesInformed
)ln(# ttradesBlock
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TABLE 4 
Incorporation of Private Information via Block Trading in FTSE 100 stocks 
The relationship between informed trading and block trading is estimated using the following model: 
 
Price impact corresponds to permanent, temporary or total price impact, and are as defined in Table 5. PIN is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm 
of the number of shares per trade; volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the natural logarithm 
of the total stock turnover on the trading day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade; Market return 
is the daily FTSE100 return on the day of the block trade. Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. DUM1 takes the value of 
1 if the trade occurs between 8:00 and 9:00; DUM2 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 9:00 and 15:30; DUM3 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 15:30 
and 16:00. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Panels A, B and C present results for when permanent price impact, temporary price impact and total price impact are 
employed as dependent variables respectively. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. The sample includes FTSE 100 
stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange between 1st October 2012 and 30th September 2013. 
      
  Panel A. Permanent Price Impact   Panel B. Temporary Price Impact   Panel C. Total Price Impact 
  Purchases Sales All Trades   Purchases Sales All Trades   Purchases Sales All Trades 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
PIN 2.94×10
-4***  -2.00×10-4** 6.81×10-7   3.86×10-4*** -8.33×10-4*** -1.43×10-4   1.13×10-3 6.22×10-4*** 1.99×10-4* 
  (7.74×10
-5) (9.01×10-5) (1.00×10-4)   (4.64×10-5) (7.38×10-5) (1.40×10-4)   (1.14×10-3) (1.01×10-4) (1.19×10-4) 
Ln(size) -1.01×10
-6 1.13×10-5*** 3.94×10-6**   2.31×10-6** 5.88×10-6* -7.07×10-7   3.89×10-5 4.81×10-6 9.41×10-8 
  (1.96×10
-6) (2.1×10-6) (1.57×10-6)   (1.00×10-6) (3.06×10-6) (6.25×10-6)   (4.24×10-5) (3.38×10-6) (3.05×10-6) 
Volatility 3.02×10
-5 1.78×10-4 5.47×10-6   3.26×10-4* 2.41×10-3*** 0.01   0.02 -2.17×10-3*** -8.66×10-3*** 
  (3.33×10
-4) (2.92×10-4) (2.50×10-4)   (1.93×10-4) (7.55×10-4) (3.57×10-3)   (0.02) (7.24×10-4) (1.79×10-3) 
Ln(turnover) 1.31×10
-5 ***  -1.52×10-5*** -1.54×10-6   1.54×10-5*** 2.21×10-5*** -3.8×10-8   5.83×10-5 -3.60×10-5*** -7.93×10-6 
  (6.25×10
-6) (4.13×10-6) (4.55×10-6)   (2.31×10-6) (5.95×10-6) (1.11×10-5)   (6.28×10-5) (6.43×10-6) (7.62×10-6) 
Market Return -8.22×10
-4  ***  -1.16×10-4 -4.72×10-4*   -9.71×10-4*** 5.42×10-3*** 1.30×10-3   7.37×10-3 -5.38×10-3*** -2.49×10-3*** 
  (3.86×10
-4) (3.22×10-4) (2.55×10-4)   (2.01×10-4) (6.57×10-4) (1.58×10-3)   (7.27×10-3) (6.51×10-4) (8.40×10-4) 
Momentum 1.14×10
-5 6.10×10-5*** 2.39×10-5   -5.03×10-5*** 7.71×10-5*** -1.71×10-4   6.38×10-5 -1.51×10-5 6.77×10-5 
  (2.11×10
-5) (1.65×10-5) (1.74×10-5)   (1.18×10-5) (2.48×10-5) (2.09×10-4)   (1.74×10-5) (2.50×10-5) (8.10×10-5) 
OIB -1.03×10
-5 6.12×10-5 6.81×10-5*   -7.47×10-5*** -2.82×10-4*** -4.05×10-4   3.79×10-4 3.38×10-4*** 3.87×10-4*** 
  (7.00×10
-5) (4.12×10-5) (3.89×10-5)   (2.40×10-5) (6.96×10-5) (1.41×10-4)   (3.40×10-4) (7.18×10-5) (8.86×10-5) 
BAS 0.42 ***  -0.199*** 0.12**   -0.42*** 0.96*** 0.41***   0.76*** -1.16*** -0.23*** 
 3112101987654321 ||RelnlnPr DUMDUMDUMOIBBASMomentumturnMarketTurnoverVolatilitySizePINimpactice
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  (0.05) (0.07) (0.046)   (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)   (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
DUM1 9.66×10
-5 ***  -7.92×10-5*** 7.20×10-6   5.44×10-5*** -2.46×10-4*** -1.46×10-4***   7.59×10-5** 1.66×10-4*** 1.36×10-4*** 
(8:00 - 9:00)  (1.94×10
-5) (1.63×10-5) (1.21×10-5)   (9.29×10-6) (1.71×10-5) (2.96×10-5)   (3.60×10-5) (2.10×10-5) (2.13×10-5) 
DUM2 2.10×10
-5*** -3.13×10-5*** -1.10×10-5**   1.20×10-5* -9.09×10-5*** -1.49×10-5   8.52×10-5 5.99×10-5*** 1.19×10-5 
(9:00 - 15:30) (7.78×10
-6) (6.07×10-6) (4.85×10-6)   (7.31×10-6) (1.41×10-5) (3.06×10-5)   (7.50×10-5) (1.37×10-5) (1.65×10-5) 
DUM3 1.22×10
-5 -3.01×10-5*** -1.19×10-5**   3.42×10-7 -1.44×10-4*** -1.11×10-4***   8.56×10-6 1.13×10-4*** 8.22×10-5*** 
(15:30 - 16:00) (8.96×10
-6) (6.33×10-6) (5.50×10-6)   (8.33×10-6) (1.88×10-5) (2.84×10-5)   (5.39×10-6) (1.79×10-5) (1.69×10-5) 
Constant 5.96×10
-5 -1.99×10-4*** -6.77×10-5**   1.03×10-4*** 6.59×10-4*** 2.36×10-4   -1.78×10-4 -8.45×10-4*** -3.55×10-4*** 
  (5.56×10
-5) (3.93×10-5) (3.42×10-5)   (2.28×10-5) (6.75×10-5) (1.26×10-4)   (1.04×10-4) (6.99×10-5) (8.33×10-5) 
Observations 206,002 246,867 453,012   206,002 246,867 453,012   206,002 246,867 453,012 
R-squared 0.77% 0.34% 0.07%   2.14% 1.40% 0.05%   2.92% 1.89% 0.06% 
Adj R-squared 0.76% 0.34% 0.06%   2.14% 1.39% 0.05%   2.92% 1.89% 0.06% 
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TABLE 5 
Intraday Mean Price Impact for Purchase and Sale Block trades  
This table shows the average permanent, total and temporary price impact estimates for FTSE 100 stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange. The five-trade benchmark is 
used to calculate the price impact measures. Thus, for temporary price impact (Equation 1), we measure the percentage of price reversal after five trades after a block trade 
execution, and for permanent price impact Equation (2) captures the percentage change in price from five trades before the block trade to five trades following the block trade. 
The third price impact measure, total impact, captures the total percentage price impact, which includes both the liquidity and the information component: 
   (1) 
5
55

 
t
tt
P
PP
impactPermanent
   (2) 
              (3) 
The sample includes FTSE 100 stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange between 1st October 2012 and 30th September 2013.  
t
tt
P
PP
impactTemporary

 5
5
5


t
tt
P
PP
impactTotal
 Purchase block trades Sale block trades 
Time of the day 
Permanent Price 
Impact 
Total Price 
Impact 
Temporary Price 
Impact 
Permanent Price 
Impact 
Total Price 
Impact 
Temporary Price 
Impact 
8:00 -8:29 0.0420% 0.2003% -0.0024% -0.0276% -0.0683% 0.0316% 
8:30-8:59 0.0183% 0.0170% 0.0012% -0.0152% -0.0484% 0.0337% 
9:00-9:29 0.0183% 0.0178% 0.0005% -0.0160% -0.0554% 0.0400% 
9:30-9:59 0.0165% 0.0173% -0.0008% -0.0155% -0.0431% 0.0280% 
10:00-10:29 0.0172% 0.0192% -0.0021% -0.0125% -0.0439% 0.0317% 
10:30-10:59 0.0179% 0.0178% 0.0001% -0.0151% -0.0489% 0.0343% 
11:00-11:29 0.0162% 0.0177% -0.0015% -0.0182% -0.0518% 0.0341% 
11:30-11:59 0.0173% 0.1228% -0.0005% -0.0153% -0.0493% 0.0345% 
12:00-12:29 0.0169% 0.0176% -0.0007% -0.0130% -0.0555% 0.0431% 
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12:30-12:59 0.0247% 0.0190% 0.0057% -0.0093% -0.0458% 0.0369% 
13:00-13:29 0.0164% 0.0158% 0.0007% -0.0119% -0.0477% 0.0362% 
13:30-13:59 0.0195% 0.0173% 0.0021% -0.0158% -0.0457% 0.0303% 
14:00-14:29 0.0148% 0.0154% -0.0006% -0.0145% -0.0513% 0.0373% 
14:30-14:59 0.0179% 0.0158% 0.0020% -0.0156% -0.0418% 0.0266% 
15:00-15:29 0.0156% 0.0149% 0.0007% -0.0147% -0.0454% 0.0310% 
15:30-15:59 0.0150% 0.0149% 0.0001% -0.0140% -0.0389% 0.0252% 
16:00-16:30 0.0134% 0.0126% 0.0008% -0.0107% -0.0489% 0.0386% 
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TABLE 6 
Incorporation of Private Information via Purchase Block Trading in FTSE 100 Stocks across Trading Hours 
The relationship between informed trading and purchase block trading across intraday trading intervals is estimated using the following model: 
 ||RelnlnPr 87654321 OIBBASMomentumturnMarketTurnoverVolatilitySizePINimpactice  
Price impact corresponds to permanent, temporary or total price impact, and are as defined in Table 5. PIN is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm 
of the number of shares per trade; volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the natural logarithm 
of the total stock turnover on the trading day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade; Market return 
is the daily FTSE100 return on the day of the block trade. Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. Panels A, B and C present results for when permanent price impact, temporary price impact and total price impact are employed as dependent variables 
respectively. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. The sample includes FTSE 100 stocks trading on the London Stock 
Exchange between 1st October 2012 and 30th September 2013.   
  Panel A. Permanent Price Impact     Panel B. Temporary Price Impact     Panel C. Total Price Impact   
  
8:00 - 9:00 9:00   - 15: 30 15:30 - 16:00 16:00 - 16:30 
  
8:00 - 9:00 9:00  - 15: 30 
15:30 - 
16:00 
16:00 - 16:30 
  
8:00 - 9:00 9:00 - 15: 30 15:30 - 16:00 
16:00 - 
16:30       
      
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
PIN 
5.99×10-4** 3.96×10-4*** 9.42×10-5 2.37×10-4   3.45×10-4*** 3.03×10-4*** 1.34×10-4 4.25×10-4   2.50×10-4 9.23×10-5*** -4.04×10-5 -1.90×10-4 
  (2.58×10
-4) (3.98×10-5) (1.03×10-4) (2.79×10-4)   (1.15×10-4) (3.08×10-5) (8.43×10-5) (2.97×10-4)   (2.45×10-4) (3.16×10-5) (7.14×10-5) (1.06×10-4) 
Ln(size) -9.95×10
-7 8.7×10-7 -5.09×10-6* 4.00×10-6   5.23×10-6 7.45×10-7 -2.81×10-6 4.00×10-6   -6.30×10-6 1.2×10-7 -2.28×10-6 -1.01×10-7 
  (1.02×10
-5) (1.70×10-6) (2.98×10-6) (3.96×10-6)   (3.68×10-6) (1.49×10-6) (2.44×10-6) (3.92×10-6)   (9.09×10-6) (3.84×10-6) (2.13×10-6) (6.30×10-6) 
Volatility 1.14×10
-3 5.48×10-5 4.65×10-4 6.96×10-4   1.85×10-4 3.05×10-4 5.43×10-4***  4.11×10-4   -1.32×10-3 -2.51×10-4 -7.87×10-5 2.84×10-4 
  (1.93×10
-3) (2.75×10-4) (6.74×10-4) (5.61×10-4)   (8.81×10-4) (2.01×10-4) (4.41×10-5) (4.57×10-4)   (1.67×10-3) (1.93×10-4) (4.03×10-5) (3.19×10-4) 
Ln(turnover) 4.52×10
-5 5.68×10-6** 1.05×10-5 2.01×10-5*   4.03×10-5*** 8.39×10-6*** 8.15×10-6 1.51×10-5   5.30×10-6 -2.72×10-6 2.38×10-6 4.60×10-6 
  (3.04×10
-5) (2.91×10-6) (7.97×10-6) (1.18×10-5)   (6.99×10-6) (1.88×10-6) (5.97×10-6) (1.12×10-5)   (2.94×10-5) (2.11×10-6) (4.00×10-6) (3.70×10-6) 
Market 
Return 
-3.41×10-3* 6.22×10-5 -1.40×10-3 -2.19×10-3***   -2.40×10-3*** -3.41×10-4* 1.91×10-3 -1.61×10--3***   -1.02×10-3 4.03×10-4 5.15×10-4 -5.76×10-4* 
  (1.93×10-3) (2.58×10-4) (1.25×10-3) (6.21×10-4)   (7.17×10-4) (1.88×10-4) (1.18×10-3) (5.45×10-4)   (1.79×10-3) (1.74×10-4) (3.65×10-4) (3.02×10-4) 
Momentum 1.66×10
-4 -4.31×10-5*** 1.86×10-5 1.95×10-5   -1.24×10-4** -4.52×10-5*** -3.44×10-6 1.25×10-6   2.91×10-4*** 2.4×10-6 2.23×10-5 1.83×10-5 
  (1.13×10
-4) (1.62×10-5) (2.57×10-5) (2.47×10-5)   (5.12×10-5) (1.16×10-5) (1.58×10-3) (1.67×10-5)   (3.93×10-5) (9.09×10-6) (1.76×10-5) (1.23×10-5) 
OIB 7.73×10
-4* -1.44×10-4*** -4.91×10-5 -1.55×10-4**   5.22×10-5 -9.76×10-5*** -2.14×10-5 -1.25×10-4**   7.21×10-4* -4.62×10-5** -2.77×10-5 -3.03×10-5 
  (4.22×10
-4) (3.40×10-5) (2.54×10-5) (6.68×10-5)   (1.11×10-3) (2.41×10-5) (5.25×10-5) (6.04×10-5)   (4.07×10-4) (2.35×10-5) (5.38×10-5) (3.26×10-5) 
BAS 0.54*** 0.24*** 0.368*** 0.24   -0.474*** -0.348*** -0.17*** -0.38*   1.02*** 0.59*** 0.54*** 0.63*** 
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  (0.09) (0.02) (0.06) (0.18)   (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.20)   (0.09) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) 
Constant 2.66×10
-4 2.52×10-5 1.65×10-4* 1.74×10-4***   4.12×10-4*** 6.94×10-5*** 9.23×10-5 7.32×10-5   -1.46×10-4 -4.4×10-5** 7.29×10-5 1.01×10-4*** 
  (3.02×10
-4) (2.81×10-5) (9.17×10-5) (6.74×10-5)   (7.91×10-5) (2.85×10-5) (7.18×10-5) (6.08×10-5)   (2.98×10-4) (1.90×10-5) (5.62×10-5) (3.42×10-5) 
Observations 35,490 129,411 15,262 25,839   35,490 129,411 15,262 25,839   35,490 129,411 15,262 25839 
R-squared 0.80% 1.00% 1.09% 0.25%   4.42% 1.88% 0.32% 0.31%   2.56% 7.10% 5.53% 10.06% 
Adj R-
squared 
0.78% 1.00% 1.03% 0.22%   4.40% 1.88% 0.27% 0.28%   2.54% 7.10% 5.48% 10.04% 
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TABLE 7 
Incorporation of Private Information via Sale Block Trading in FTSE 100 Stocks across Trading Hours 
The relationship between informed trading and sale block trading across intraday trading intervals is estimated using the following model: 
 
Price impact corresponds to permanent, temporary or total price impact, and are as defined in Table 5. PIN is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm 
of the number of shares per trade; volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the natural logarithm 
of the total stock turnover on the trading day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade; Market return 
is the daily FTSE100 return on the day of the block trade. Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. Panels A, B and C present results for when permanent price impact, temporary price impact and total price impact are employed as dependent variables 
respectively. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. The sample includes FTSE 100 stocks trading on the London Stock 
Exchange between 1st October 2012 and 30th September 2013.      
 
  Panel A. Permanent Price Impact     Panel B. Temporary Price Impact     Panel C. Total Price Impact   
  
8:00 - 9:00 9:00  - 15: 30 15:30 - 16:00 
16:00 - 
16:30 
  
8:00 - 9:00 9:00   - 15: 30 
15:30 - 
16:00 
16:00 - 16:30 
  
8:00 - 9:00 9:00 -15: 30 15:30 - 16:00 
16:00 - 
16:30 
      
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
PIN -1.15×10-4 2.91×10-3 -2.44×10-4*** -1.09×10-4   -2.00×10-4 5.46×10-3 -1.44×10-3*** -1.78×10-3***   3.12×10-4 3.74×10-3 1.17×10-3*** 1.70×10-3*** 
  (2.87×10-4) (2.44×10-3) (8.41×10-5) (1.28×10-4)   (1.75×10-4) (0.02) (3.83×10-4) (2.97×10-4)   (2.85×10-4) (2.46×10-3) (3.50×10-4) (2.60×10-4) 
Ln(size) 3.18×10-5*** 2.72×10-5 -5.29×10-7 3.8×10-6   1.39×10-5** -1.55×10-3* 2.47×10-5** -5.96×10-5*   1.80×10-5* 8.11×10-5* -2.50×10-5** 4.58×10-5*** 
  (8.69×10-6) (3.79×10-5) (1.00×10-5) (3.57×10-6)   (6.07×10-6) (8.59×10-4) (1.14×10-5) (3.06×10-5)   (9.90×10-6) (4.29×10-5) (1.07×10-5) (1.53×10-5) 
Volatility 3.52×10-3** 3.56 -1.67×10-4 -1.14×10-3   3.13×10-3* 6.78*** -4.16×10-4 1.12×10-2   4.23×10-4 3.43 1.97×10-4 -6.51×10-3 
  (1.47×10-3) (2.51) (7.26×10-4) (9.87×10-4)   (1.84×10-3) (2.24) (1.43×10-3) (0.01)   (1.97×10-3) (2.51) (1.52×10-3) (4.68×10-3) 
Ln(turnover) -3.81×10-5** 1.29×10-3 -4.93×10-6 -8.93×10-6   3.00×10-5** 3.82×10-3* 3.39×10-5 1.38×10-5   -7.60×10-6 1.23×10-3 -3.76×10-5* -2.81×10-5 
  (1.75×10-5) (9.19×10-4) (6.33×10-6) (6.16×10-6)   (1.18×10-5) (2.21×10-3) (2.19×10-5) (3.59×10-5)   (1.88×10-5) (9.22×10-4) (2.03×10-5) (2.92×10-5) 
Market 
Return 
-4.67×10-3*** -9.78×10-2 -1.12×10-4 -1.19×10-3***   3.93×10-3** 0.13 -1.07×10-3 2.26×10-3   -8.47×10-3*** -0.107 8.20×10-4 -1.53×10-3 
  (1.62×10-3) (0.07) (4.87×10-4) (5.44×10-4)   (1.39×10-3) (0.17) (2.24×10-3) (3.71×10-3)   (1.85×10-3) (0.07) (2.10×10-3) (2.24×10-3) 
Momentum 2.44×10-4*** -2.88×10-3 2.08×10-5 2.99×10-5   1.13×10-4** 6.5×10-3 6.47×10-5 -6.18×10-5   1.32×10-4 -2.87×10-3 -4.19×10-5 7.38×10-5 
  (8.18×10-5) (2.06×10-3) (2.80×10-5) (2.68×10-5)   (4.72×10-5) (5.56×10-3) (6.48×10-5) (8.26×10-5)   (6.95×10-4) (2.08×10-3) (6.18×10-5) (4.56×10-5) 
OIB 1.63×10-4 1.08×10-3 1.39×10-4* -1.38×10-4*   2.15×10
-4 -0.04** -2.98×10-4 -1.07×10-3**   -4.26×10-5 1.16×10-2 4.17×10-4 6.27×10-4** 
  (2.24×10-4) (7.61×10-3) (7.16×10-5) (7.67×10-5)   (2.11×10
-4) (0.02) (2.89×10-4) (5.39×10-4)   (2.70×10-4) (7.60×10-3) (2.66×10-4) (3.03×10-4) 
BAS -0.29** -3.77 -0.24*** -0.144   0.89*** 5.66 1.035*** 1.16***   -1.18*** -5.15** -1.24*** -1.33*** 
  (0.14) (2.62) (0.05) (0.12)   (0.05) (5.34) (0.22) (0.16)   (0.13) (2.61) (0.20) (0.15) 
 ||RelnlnPr 87654321 OIBBASMomentumturnMarketTurnoverVolatilitySizePINimpactice
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Constant -7.14×10-4*** 8.59×10-3 -5.05×10-5 -1.31×10-4**   -3.70×10-4*** 0.05* 7.63×10-4*** 1.40×10-3***   -3.38×10-4 7.38×10-3 -7.97×10-4*** -1.44×10-3*** 
  (1.99×10-4) (6.23×10-3) (6.67×10-5) (6.58×10-5)   1.38×10-4 (0.02) (2.33×10-4) (4.17×10-4)   (2.15×10-4) (6.26×10-3) (2.22×10-4) (3.07×10-4) 
Observations 41,492 156,625 18,224 30,476   41,492 156,625 18,224 30,476   41,492 156,625 18,224 30,476 
R-squared 0.40% 0.37% 0.79% 0.22%   4.01% 0.30% 0.47% 0.08%   3.58% 0.34% 0.77% 0.29% 
Adj R-
squared 0.39% 0.36% 0.74% 0.19%   4.00% 0.29% 0.42% 0.05%   3.56% 0.34% 0.73% 0.26% 
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TABLE 8 
Inter-day relationship between PIN and Block Trades 
This table shows the regression results of the relationship between the inter-day percentage change of number of 
block trades and the probability of an informed trade.  Panel A reports the regression coefficient estimates for 
block trades sample during the entire continuous trading day, while Panel B reports the regression coefficient 
estimates for the one-hour period between 08:00 and 09:00hrs. We use the following model: 
 

161514131211
1
||ln)
#
#
ln( tttttt
t
t OIBMomentumreturnMarketTurnoverVolatilityPIN
tradesBlock
tradesBlock
 
ln(
#Block tradest
#Block tradest-1
)
 corresponds to the natural logarithm of number of block trades at day t divided by the number 
of block trades at day t-1, it depicts the change of number of block trades based on the previous trading day. PIN 
is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm of the number of shares per trade; volatility 
is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the 
natural logarithm of the total stock turnover on the trading day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order 
imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade; Market return is the daily FTSE100 return on 
the day of the block trade. Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block 
trade. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. The sample includes FTSE 100 stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange 
between 1st October 2012 and 30th September 2013. 
      
  Panel A. Block Trades during the day 
  Panel B. Block Trades during the first 
trading hour (8:00-9:00)     
  
Block 
Purchases    
Block 
Sales   
All Block 
Trades   
Block 
Purchases  
  
Block 
Sales 
  
All Block 
Trades 
  Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient 
                        
 
PINt-1 
 
0.25*   0.23*   0.44***   0.41**   0.25   0.35** 
 (0.14)   (0.13)   (0.10)   (0.19)   (0.21)   (0.16) 
 
Turnovert-1 
 
0.07***   0.07***   0.06***   0.07***   0.04**   0.07*** 
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
 
Momentum 
 
-0.05   -0.05   -0.06   0.01   0.02   -0.04 
 (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.04)   (0.07)   (0.07)   (-0.06) 
 
Volatility t-1 
 
0.92   0.36   2.51   0.45   -1.77   -1.16 
 (2.04)   (1.98)   (1.67)   (0.28)   (3.21)   (2.51) 
 
OIB t-1 
 
0.08   0.06   -0.11   -0.23   -0.45**   -0.22 
 (0.14)   (0.15)   (0.11)   (0.19)   (0.21)   (0.16) 
 
Market Return t-1 
 
-4.84***   -5.15***   0.28   -0.37   2.31   -0.12 
 (1.25)   (1.27)   (1.00)   (1.62)   (1.86)   (1.48) 
Constant 0.54***   0.58***   0.38***   0.55***   0.35   0.60*** 
 (0.15)   (0.15)   (0.10)   (0.21)   (0.23)   (0.19) 
Observations 9,555   9,224   10,071   6,598   5,360   8,306 
R-squared 0.49%   0.51%   0.62%   0.36%   0.23%   0.35% 
Adj R-squared 0.47%   0.44%   0.55%   0.28%   0.14%   0.29% 
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TABLE 9 
Stock Transparency and Incorporation of Private Information via Purchase Block Trading in FTSE 100 Stocks 
The relationship between informed trading and purchase block trading in FTSE 100 stocks with varying levels of stock transparency is estimated using the following model: 
  3112101987654321 ||Relnln DUMDUMDUMOIBBASMomentumturnMarketTurnoverVolatilitySizePINimpactPirce
 
Price impact corresponds to permanent, temporary or total price impact, and are as defined in Table 5. PIN is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm 
of the number of shares per trade; volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the natural logarithm 
of the total stock turnover on the trading day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade; Market return 
is the daily FTSE100 return on the day of the block trade. Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. DUM1 takes the value of 
1 if the trade occurs between 8:00 and 9:00; DUM2 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 9:00 and 15:30; DUM3 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 15:30 
and 16:00. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. PIN estimates are used as proxies for stocks’ levels of transparency; on this basis, stocks are partitioned into transparency 
quartiles/portfolios. The highest (lowest) PIN stocks are designated as Portfolio 1 (4) stocks. Panels A, B and C present results for when permanent price impact, temporary 
price impact and total price impact are employed as dependent variables respectively. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels 
respectively. The sample includes FTSE 100 stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange between 1st October 2012 and 30th September 2013. 
 
  Panel A. Permanent Price Impact     Panel B. Temporary Price Impact   Panel C. Total Price Impact 
  
Portfolio1 
(High-PIN) 
Portfolio2 Portfolio3 
Portfolio 4 
(Low-PIN) 
  
Portfolio1 
(High-PIN) 
Portfolio2 Portfolio3 
Portfolio 4 
(Low-PIN) 
  
Portfolio1 
(High-PIN) 
Portfolio2 Portfolio3 
Portfolio 4 
(Low-PIN) 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
PIN 5.46×10
-4*** 3.65×10-4** 1.84×10-4*** 1.84×10-4*   2.15×10-5 -9.21×10-5 1.95×10-4*** 8.27×10-5   3.32×10-4 4.56×10-4*** 1.13×10-5 4.85×10-5 
  (-2.64×10
-4) (1.51×10-4) (6.81×10-5) (1.08×10-4)   (1.52×10-4) (7.08×10-5) (3.07×10-5) (6.43×10-5)   (2.08×10-4) (1.38×10-4) (5.56×10-5) (8.31×10-5) 
Ln(size) 1.43×10
-5 8.46×10-6* -6.16×10-6*** -7.63×10-6*   3.59×10-6 9.99×10-6*** -3.78×10-6*** 6.23×10-6*   1.07×10-5 -1.56×10-6 -2.38×10-6 -1.53×10-5*** 
  (1.27×10
-5) (4.74×10-6) (2.13×10-6) (4.34×10-6)   (6.35×10-6) (2.34×10-6) (1.29×10-6) (3.39×10-7)   (1.17×10-5) (5.71×10-6) (1.59×10-6) (4.18×10-6) 
Volatility -5.62×10
-3* 8.82×10-6 1.46×10-4 5.68×10-4   2.28×10-4 2.34×10-4 2.50×10-4 6.67×10-4*   -5.89×10-3** -2.25×10-4 -1.04×10-4 1.18×10-4 
  (3.39×10
-3) (9.01×10-4) (4.29×10-4) (6.84×10-4)   (1.34×10-3) (5.09×10-4) (2.25×10-4) (4.04×10-4)   (2.82×10-3) (4.69×10-4) (3.71×10-4) (5.36×10-4) 
Ln(turnover) -1.68×10
-5 -3.72×10-5*** 2.61×10-6 2.11×10-5**   -9.5×10-6 -1.59×10-5*** 1.32×10-5*** 2.16×10-5***   -7.35×10-6 -2.07×10-5* -1.05×10-5*** -3.23×10-6 
  (3.47×10
-5) (1.27×10-5) (4.76×10-6) (9.50×10-6)   (1.82×10-5) (6.11×10-6) (1.97×10-6) (6.47×10-6)   (2.69×10-5) (1.17×10-5) (4.10×10-6) (9.97×10-6) 
Market 
Return 
-3.80×10-3* 4.45×10-4 -1.08×10-3*** -5.93×10-4   -2.00×10-3 -7.50×10-4*** -9.32×10-4*** -7.18×10-4*   -1.82×10-3 1.20×10-3 -1.42×10-4 -7.15×10-4 
(2.29×10-3) (1.03×10-3) (3.76×10-4) (6.45×10-4)   (1.25×10-3) (1.87×10-4) (2.09×10-4) (4.35×10-4)   (1.82×10-3) (9.26×10-4) (3.16×10-4) (6.06×10-4) 
Momentum -4.46×10
-6 1.08×10-4*** 2.45×10-5 -2.11×10-5   -6.30×10-5** 6.07×10-6 3.75×10-6 -6.76×10-5***   5.86×10-5 1.01×10-4*** 2.07×10-5 4.88×10-5*** 
  (5.00×10
-5) (4.08×10-5) (1.98×10-5) (3.09×10-5)   (2.64×10-5) (2.02×10-5) (1.05×10-5) (2.30×10-5)   (4.18×10-5) (3.36×10-5) (1.61×10-5) (2.46×10-5) 
47 
 
OIB -8.10×10
-4*** 2.37×10-4** -1.09×10-5 -1.77×10-4*   -1.85×10-4* -3.21×10-5 -6.38×10-5** -8.37×10-5*   -6.24×10-4*** 2.69×10-4*** 5.16×10-5 -8.47×10-5 
  (2.16×10
-4) (1.07×10-4) (5.01×10-5) (7.73×10-5)   (9.64×10-5) (5.52×10-5) (2.79×10-5) (4.44×10-5)   (1.87×10-4) (9.41×10-5) (4.48×10-5) (6.85×10-5) 
BAS 0.45** 0.24** 0.49*** 0.488***   -0.39*** -0.55*** -0.54*** -0.38***   0.84*** 0.79*** 1.03*** 0.86*** 
  (0.19) (0.12) (0.09) (0.07)   (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)   (0.15) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
DUM1 4.65×10
-4*** 1.08×10-4** 3.45×10-5** 8.34×10-5***   1.56×10-4*** 7.58×10-5*** 7.13×10-5*** 4.32×10-5**   3.08×10-4*** 3.26×10-5 -3.63×10-5*** 1.47×10-5 
  (1.15×10
-4) (4.48×10-5) (1.70×10-5) (2.69×10-5)   (4.88×10-5) (1.96×10-5) (7.04×10-6) (1.82×10-5)   (1.04×10-4) (4.78×10-5) (1.55×10-5) (2.73×10-5) 
DUM2 7.12×10
-5** 6.33×10-5*** 4.58×10-6 2.49×10-5***   4.87×10-5** 1.91×10-5** 1.7×10-5*** 1.81×10-5**   2.20×10-5 4.41×10-5*** -1.18×10-5*** 5.89×10-6 
  (2.87×10
-5) (1.12×10-5) (6.41×10-6) (9.30×10-6)   (2.25×10-5) (8.12×10-6) (5.03×10-6) (8.22×10-6)   (1.68×10-5) (8.63×10-6) (3.91×10-6) (6.12×10-6) 
DUM3 1.06×10
-4*** 2.84×10-5** 1.16×10-5 9.87×10-6   6.88×10-5*** 1.14×10-5 3.68×10-6 -1.12×10-5   3.71×10-5** 1.72×10-5* 7.89×10-6 4.32×10-6 
  (3.05×10
-5) (1.37×10-5) (7.84×10-6) (1.11×10-5)   (2.58×10-5) (1.02×10-5) (6.25×10-6) (1.44×10-5)   (1.72×10-5) (9.77×10-6) (5.16×10-6) (5.08×10-6) 
Constant -3.76×10
-4 -5.08×10-4*** 4.33×10-5 2.07×10-4**   -4.89×10-5 1.07×10-5 1.84×10-4 2.36×10-4***   -3.26×10-4 -5.19×10-4*** -1.54×10-4*** -1.89×10-5 
  (3.27×10
-4) (1.46×10-4) (5.44×10-5) (9.81×10-5)   (1.61×10-4) (6.47×10-5) (2.23×10-4) (6.50×10-5)   (2.83×10-4) (1.37×10-4) (5.00×10-5) (9.95×10-5) 
Observations 15,605 35,665 100,467 54,251   15,605 35,665 100,467 54,251   15,605 35,665 100,467 54,251 
R-squared 1.26% 0.31% 0.70% 2.32%   1.53% 3.83% 3.12% 3.75%   3.26% 2.11% 3.24% 8.41% 
Adj R-squared 1.19% 0.28% 0.69% 2.30%   1.46% 3.80% 3.11% 3.72%   3.19% 2.08% 3.23% 8.39% 
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TABLE 10 
Stock Transparency and Incorporation of Private Information via Sale Block Trading in FTSE 100 Stocks 
The relationship between informed trading and sale block trading in FTSE 100 stocks with varying levels of stock transparency is estimated using the following model: 
  3112101987654321 ||Relnln DUMDUMDUMOIBBASMomentumturnMarketTurnoverVolatilitySizePINimpactPirce
 
Price impact corresponds to permanent, temporary or total price impact, and are as defined in table 5. PIN is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm 
of the number of shares per trade; volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the natural logarithm 
of the total stock turnover on the trading day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade; Market return 
is the daily FTSE100 return on the day of the block trade. Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. DUM1 takes the value of 
1 if the trade occurs between 8:00 and 9:00; DUM2 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 9:00 and 15:30; DUM3 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 15:30 
and 16:00. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. PIN estimates are used as proxies for stocks’ levels of transparency; on this basis, stocks are partitioned into transparency 
quartiles/portfolios. The highest (lowest) PIN stocks are designated as Portfolio 1 (4) stocks. Panels A, B and C present results for when permanent price impact, temporary 
price impact and total price impact are employed as dependent variables respectively. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels 
respectively. The sample includes FTSE 100 stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange between 1st October 2012 and 30th September 2013. 
     
  Panel A. Permanent Price Impact     Panel B. Temporary Price Impact       Panel C. Total Price Impact 
  
Portfolio1 
(High-PIN) 
Portfolio2 Portfolio3 
Portfolio 4 
(Low-PIN) 
  
Portfolio1 
(High-PIN) 
Portfolio2 Portfolio3 
Portfolio 4 
(Low-PIN) 
  
Portfolio1 
(High-PIN) 
Portfolio2 Portfolio3 
Portfolio 4 
(Low-PIN) 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
PIN -4.04×10
-5 8.14×10-5 2.71×10-5 9.52×10-5   3.48×10-4 -7.24×10-4*** -7.84×10-4*** 8.60×10-4***   3.87×10-4 7.89×10-4 7.96×10-4*** -7.60×10-4*** 
  (1.97×10
-4) (1.42×10-4) (7.45×10-5) (1.01×10-4)   (2.74×10-4) (2.19×10-4) (1.18×10-4) (1.73×10-4)   (2.84×10-4) (2.30×10-4) (1.28×10-4) (1.71×10-4) 
Ln(size) 1.74×10
-5** 2.93×10-6 1.31×10-5*** -1.33×10-6   1.97×10-5* -1.69×10-6 -6.64×10-8 1.47×10-6   2.07×10-6 4.56×10-6 1.31×10--4*** -2.74×10-6 
  (7.70×10
-6) (5.09×10-6) (2.28×10-6) (4.94×10-6)   (1.07×10-5) (7.30×10-6) (4.37×10-6) (6.15×10-6)   (1.11×10-5) (8.00×10-6) (4.62×10-6) (6.86×10-6) 
Volatility 8.36×10
-4 7.96×10-5 -1.13×10-4 1.12×10-3*   2.20×10-3 -1.54×10-3* 3.14×10-3*** 3.96×10-3***   -1.32×10-3 1.59×10-3** -3.20×10-3*** -2.74×10-3 
  (2.45×10
-3) (6.74×10-4) (3.62×10-4) (6.64×10-4)   (4.90×10-3) (8.30×10-4) (1.09×10-3) (1.79×10-3)   (5.06×10-3) (7.08×10-4) (1.04×10-3) (1.77×10-3) 
Ln(turnover) -4.38×10
-5** 1.36×10-5 -2.27×10-5*** -5.34×10-6   9.52×10-6 4.01×10-5** -1.32×10-5* 1.53×10-4***   -3.45×10-5 -2.60×10-5 -9.32×10-6 -1.55×10-4*** 
  (2.05×10
-5) (1.51×10-5) (4.01×10-6) (1.27×10-5)   (2.85×10-5) (1.83×10-4) (7.49×10-6) (1.44×10-5)   (2.95×10-5) (2.17×10-5) (7.59×10-6) (1.70×10-5) 
Market Return 1.57×10-3 -1.24×10-3 1.56×10-5 -1.93×10-4   6.84×10-3*** 8.30×10-3*** 5.41×10-3*** 2.76×10-3**   5.14×10-3 -9.35×10-2*** -5.23×10-3*** -2.79×10-3** 
(1.62×10-3) (9.86×10-4) (4.06×10-4) (6.09×10-4)   (2.25×10-3) (1.63×10-3) (9.43×10-4) (1.26×10-3)   (2.33×10-3) (1.70×10-3) (9.12×10-4) (1.26×10-3) 
Momentum 5.76×10
-5 4.45×10-5 2.23×10-5 9.19×10-5***   6.25×10-6 1.04×10-4** 1.88×10-5 1.12×10-4**   5.03×10-5 -5.72×10-5 4.36×10-6 -1.98×10-5 
  (3.93×10
-4) (3.71×10-5) (2.12×10-5) (2.85×10-5)   (5.47×10-5) (5.17×10-5) (1.94×10-5) (4.93×10-5)   (5.66×10-5) (5.21×10-5) (2.42×10-5) (5.02×10-5) 
OIB 2.70×10
-3** -7.80×10-5 1.05×10-4** -6.49×10-5   -4.37×10-5 1.71×10-4 -2.58×10-4*** -8.69×10-4***   3.13×10-4 -2.48×10-4 3.58×10-4*** 7.93×10-4*** 
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  (1.54×10
-4) (9.52×10-5) (5.26×10-5) (8.44×10-5)   (2.03×10-4) (1.56×10-4) (1.11×10-4) (1.27×10-4)   (2.10×10-4) (1.65×10-4) (1.14×10-4) (1.33×10-5) 
BAS -0.56*** -0.24*** -0.45*** 0.06   0.81*** 1.03*** 1.27*** 0.93***   -1.36*** -1.27*** -1.71*** -0.86*** 
  (0.04) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13)   (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)   (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
DUM1 8.07×10
-6 -1.75×10-4*** -3.67×10-5*** -1.00×10-4***   1.34×10-5 -4.65×10-5 -4.08×10-4*** -1.32×10-4***   1.34×10-5 -1.29×10-4** 3.67×10-4*** 7.10×10-5* 
  (5.66×10
-5) (3.84×10-5) (1.71×10-5) (3.53×10-5)   (7.89×10-5) (4.44×10-5) (2.36×10-5) (3.47×10-5)   (7.41×10-5) (5.04×10-5) (2.65×10-5) (4.23×10-5) 
DUM2 2.32×10
-5 -4.43×10-5*** -1.68×10-4*** -4.65×10-5***   1.53×10-6*** 2.31×10-5 -1.81×10-4*** 4.83×10-5*   1.21×10-5 -6.66×10-4** 1.64×10-4*** 1.81×10-6 
  (4.45×10
-5) (1.38×10-5) (6.65×10-6) (1.26×10-5)   (5.04×10-5) (3.06×10-5) (2.12×10-5) (2.64×10-5)   (4.98×10-5) (2.85×10-5) (2.06×10-5) (2.48×10-5) 
DUM3 -1.13×10
-5 -3.41×10-5*** -2.38×10-5*** -3.69×10-5***   -1.52×10-4 -1.10×10-6 -2.20×10-4*** -9.66×10-5***   1.40×10-4*** -3.32×10-5 1.93×10-4*** 5.95×10-5* 
  (2.89×10
-5) (1.54×10-5) (8.27×10-6) (1.24×10-5)   (6.25×10-5) (4.25×10-5) (2.77×10-5) (3.68×10-5)   (6.03×10-5) (3.69×10-5) (2.62×10-5) (3.46×10-5) 
Constant 5.24×10
-4** -3.14×10-5 -3.30×10-4*** -1.85×10-4   -3.56×10-4 5.72×10-4*** 3.79×10-4*** 1.38×10-3***   5.33×10-4** -5.29×10-4** -6.98×10-4*** -1.53×10-3*** 
  (2.12×10
-4) (1.57×10-4) (5.53×10-5) (1.25×10-4)   (3.01×10-4) (1.96×10-4) (8.87×10-5) (1.62×10-4)   (2.12×10-4) (2.27×10-4) (8.74×10-5) (1.80×10-4) 
Observations 17,375 38,831 118,872 71,789   17,375 38,831 118,872 71,789   17,375 38,831 118,872 71,789 
R-squared 1.50% 0.43% 0.59% 0.08%   1.64% 1.34% 1.06% 2.46%   3.98% 1.97% 1.62% 2.09% 
Adj R-squared 1.44% 0.42% 0.58% 0.08%   1.58% 1.33% 1.05% 2.44%   3.91% 1.96% 1.61% 2.07% 
 
 
 
 
 
